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This paper explores the nature of crises and crisis management in relations between the European integration project and the United States, with special reference to the ‘four years’ crisis’ from 2000-2004. Although there has been a mass of literature dealing with this crisis, it has not been subjected to systematic analysis in the light of theories of crisis and its management. The paper reviews a number of key questions relating to crises and crisis management, outlines the historical record of crisis and crisis management in EC/EU-US relations, relates this to the record of crises during the George W Bush Administration, and draws conclusions about the role of crises and crisis management in EU-US relations.

The first part of the paper explores the nature of crises in international relations, drawing on a range of literatures. It identifies three key elements of crisis – context; causality; scope, intensity and contagion – and outlines their implications. The paper goes on to explore the implications for crisis management of these conceptions of crisis: who or what is crisis management for, what modes of crisis management can be identified, what are the potential outcomes and underlying logics of crisis management? On this basis the paper discusses the relevance of concepts of crisis and crisis management to EC/EU-US relations, before going on to explore the record of crises in EC/EU-US relations from the 1960s to the 1990s. In the third section of the paper, the focus is on the period 2000-2004, or the ‘four years’crisis’, with the aim of providing four readings of its origins, its characteristics, the use or non-use of management devices and the longer-term implications of the crisis. The conclusions evaluate the uses and usefulness of crisis management analysis in EU-US relations, and some possible policy implications.
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Introduction: The ‘Four Years’ Crisis’

There is a strong tendency among those who have written on the course of EU-US relations between 2000 and 2004 to claim that they threatened more than ever before the foundations of the ‘partnership’ between the United States and an integrating Europe. A combination of US assertiveness and unilateralism, European inadequacies and turbulent global conditions can be seen to have provided a potent cocktail of conflicting interests, orientations and actions putting at risk the essence of the Euro-American relationship. But there is also – and sometimes almost in the same breath – a tendency to argue that the underlying strength and sinews of the relationship are as strong as ever, if not stronger. A sampling of the vast recent literature on this question thus reveals a mild form of analytical schizophrenia, mirroring and often strongly linked to the uncertainties and contradictions visible within the policy community (see for example, in different ways Lindstrom 2003, Peterson and Pollack 2003, Jones 2004, Peterson 2004a, Allin 2004, Gordon and Shapiro 2004, Pond 2004).  

How is it possible to reconcile these positions? Is it simply a fact of Euro-American life that crises will occur, recur and be seen each time as potentially terminal? Does this mean that if and when the terminal crisis were to appear, it would be part of the problem that it was not recognised and that no appropriate efforts were made to manage it? As John Peterson has pointed out (2004b), the argument that the wolf this time really was (or is?) at the door is perhaps a misleading one, since it begs questions about what is really changing in or around the EU-US relationship. It may be more important to focus on the fact that this crisis occurred during the post-Cold War period – a period in which by definition a number of the constraints and supports for ‘Atlantic partnership’ that were prominent before 1990 no longer existed, or at least were far less prominent. Others have argued that the day-to day or month-to-month tensions over Iraq and a variety of other issues have masked a far more fundamental crisis of values and institutions within the transatlantic security community (Risse 2004) – a crisis that has been cumulative over many years and which will continue despite the patching-up or line-drawing processes symbolised by recent transatlantic diplomacy. A third group might argue that the handling of crises over a variety of political, economic and security issues is an integral part of the transatlantic relationship and that both the crises and the management are part of an uneven but persistent situation of transatlantic integration (Smith 1999, 2005a forthcoming, 2005b forthcoming).

It is clear from even such a brief summary that there is no orthodoxy as to the implications of the ‘four years’ crisis’ that was focused if not precipitated by the first George W Bush Administration. At one level, the crisis seems to have been about the management of power within EU-US relations: both the management of relative power between the EU and the US, and the management of power within the EU and the US (Smith 2005b). At a second level, the crisis seems to have been one about the maintenance and development of institutions, both at the transatlantic level and at the level of Washington and Brussels, with the interplay of ‘domestic’ institutional developments making itself felt at the transatlantic level and linking in turn to broader global institutional contexts (Peterson and Pollack 2003, etc). At a third level, the crisis appears to have been one of values and ideas, with the political discourses on either side of the Atlantic diverging in ways that threaten underlying consensus on what is to be pursued or achieved in the political, economic and security spheres. Finally, the crisis appears to have been one of approaches to world order, encapsulating key differences between the modes of thought and action characterising the USA and the EU, and embodying the search for new ways of shaping the post-Cold War order (Smith 2004).

These multiple dimensions of crisis enable us to analyse and evaluate many of the episodes around which EU-US relations have turned during the past four years. There is a kind of standard ‘menu’ for such issues, encompassing Iraq (and by extension the greater Middle East), the ‘war on terror’, the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, and a range of human rights questions. It seems clear that these areas of tension or crisis have been managed with different levels of effectiveness or finality: most if not all of them remain on the agenda of EU-US relations as problems to be addressed during the next four years and beyond, and as challenges both for the EU and for Washington. It also seems clear that at the superficial level, the crises that have occurred have been concentrated in the political/security part of the spectrum rather than in the political/economic part: although there have been significant and continuing economic tensions between the EU and the US, centring on issues including WTO negotiations, bilateral commercial disputes, the management of currencies and other matters, there has not been visible a tendency to define these as fundamental or threatening to the very fabric of EU-US relations. One initial conclusion from this might be that in the more dynamic and uncertain conditions of political/security relationships after the Cold War, there is less prospect of effective and cumulative crisis management than in the no less dynamic but much more thoroughly institutionalised and ‘integrated’ world of political/economic relations. It might also be argued that the crisis of the early 2000s displays three distinct types of divergence as between the EU and the US: analytical divergence (how is crisis identified and described?), discursive divergence (how is crisis articulated?) and prescriptive or normative divergence (how or why is crisis to be managed?), and that these divergences have grown rather than shrunk as a result of the events of 2000-2004.

But such a statements beg the question that is at the centre of this paper: in the context of EU-US relations, what do we mean by ‘crisis’ and by ‘crisis management’? Whilst it is clear that such terms spring readily to the lips of policy-makers and commentators, it is less clear what they imply analytically and for the longer-term analysis of the EU-US relationship. The purpose of this paper is to raise (at least in an initial form) a range of questions about crisis and crisis management in EU-US relations, to relate them to the experience of EU-US relations in a historical sense, and to apply them in more detail to the experience of the last four years. The definition of ‘crisis’ adopted in the paper is guided by those episodes in EU-US relations that have been defined by participants and commentators as crises, in the sense that they have challenged the continued existence or the operating principles of the ‘Euro-American system’. The term ‘crisis management’ is taken in a broad sense to indicate the ways in which the parties either independently or acting together have attempted to cope with these crises. Although it is an intriguing avenue for investigation at another time, the argument here is not concerned with the convergence or divergence of EU and US approaches to the management of crises outside their mutual relations, except insofar as these are ‘internalised’ into the transatlantic sphere. In addition to putting forward a set of analytical approaches, the paper will develop three empirical propositions in relation to EU-US relations during the George W Bush presidency:

	First, that the end of the Cold War has indeed created new types of crisis and generated new modes of crisis management for EU-US relations. This reflects not only broad processes of change within the ‘Euro-American system’, but also the extent to which these have become reflected in a policy-makers’ understandings and responses to the evolution of EU-US relations in a turbulent world.
	Second, that the above proposition holds most strongly in the area of political/security relations. In the area of political/economic relations, there is more continuity both of crises and of crisis management mechanisms, reflecting the accumulation of experience, understandings and institutional frameworks in EU-US relations.
	Third, that as a result it is central to a systematic analysis of crises and crisis management in EU-US relations to acknowledge and chart the different trajectories and histories of these phenomena in on the one hand the political/economic arena and on the other, the political/security arena.

To return to terms used at the beginning of the paper, the question might be framed as follows: ‘is the wolf at the door, or is it groundhog day?’ The obvious argument is that as in other aspects of EU-US relations, it’s a bit of both (see also Jones 2004, Peterson 2004a, 2004b). The extended history of EU-US crises since the 1960s supports in a very general way the argument that the ‘four years’ crisis’ is simply a reprise of previous episodes, whilst a focus on the post-Cold War period understandably conveys the impression that things are rather different and rather novel. The aim here is to be more precise about what ‘shadows of the past’ and what ‘shadows of the future’ are reflected in the events of the past four years. In this context, the problem of relating rhetoric and policy-maker discourse about ‘transatlantic crises’ to the reality of turbulence, tensions and the messiness of practical management is a continuing theme but one that has new resonance in the new millennium. 


Towards a Framework for the Analysis of EU-US Crises

There is a long tradition and a vast literature surrounding the occurrence of transatlantic crises (see for example Smith 1984, Peterson 1996, Sloan 2002 and many, many others). Much of this literature is focused as much on the experience of NATO as it is on the ways in which crises have occurred between the US and an integrating Europe (and this is significant in the bigger picture of the evolution of EC/EU-US crises and their management, as will be seen later). All of it, however, can be interpreted as expressing the growth and development of a ‘Euro-American system’ in which the EC and later the EU have occupied an increasingly central place (Mcguire and Smith 2005 forthcoming, chapters 1-3). The notion of a system implies that between the US and an integrating Europe there has developed a set of institutions, understandings and practices with sufficient regularity and persistence to constitute a permanent structure of the broader world arena. It is possible to be more specific, and to identify four dimensions of the ‘Euro-American system’:

	First, it can be conceived as a set of power relations, in which the key organising principle is the distribution and management of power between the participants. This is essentially a realist or neo-realist position, in which the predominant issue is the development and management of the ‘balance of power’, and in which as a result one of the key issues for EU-US relations is the management of US power. Analysis of the ‘Euro-American system’ in terms of alliance and burden-sharing is one feature of the literature dealing with this area.

	Second, it can be seen as a set of market relations, in which the key organising features are patterns of production and exchange between the participants, and in which one of the central issues is the management of interdependence and integration among the economies of the North Atlantic area, increasingly encompassed by EU-US relations. This is broadly a liberal position; analysis of the ‘Euro-American system’ in terms of complex interdependence and as a space of uneven economic integration is one feature of the literature on this dimension.

	Third, it can be conceived as a set of social relations, in which the key organising feature is the patterns of communication, ideas and understandings among policy communities in the North Atlantic area, and in which the sets of ideas surrounding EU-US relations have become increasingly central. Analysis of the ‘Euro-American system’ as a security community is one of the key features in the literature on this dimension.

	Fourth, it can be conceived as a set of institutional relations, in which the key feature is the increasing institutional density of the North Atlantic area, and in which institutions have increasingly become organised around the EU-US core, at intergovernmental, transgovernmental and transnational levels. Analysis of the ‘Euro-American system’ as a form of multilevel governance system is prominent in exploration of this dimension.

None of these four conceptions of the ‘Euro-American system’ is necessarily predominant or exclusive: the nature of the system (and some would argue, the reason for its robustness and longevity) lies in the interaction and intersection of these four elements. But the interaction and the balance between the elements is subject to change, fluctuation and reinterpretation, in such a way that the ‘Euro-American system’ has been reinvented or re-written many times during its sixty-or-more year history. 

Three trends, though, are crucial to the argument here: first, increasingly, the ‘Euro-American system’ has become co-extensive with EU-US relations. This argument will not be developed in detail here, but it needs to be stated with great clarity and it lies behind a good deal of the argument that follows. The ‘Euro-American system’ in terms of power, markets, ideas and institutions has over sixty years become largely though not completely the EU-US system. And this trend shows many signs of continuing and deepening. Second, throughout its existence, the system has been open to and sensitive to developments in the broader global arena. In the area of power, it has been subject to the broader array of power in the world arena; in the area of market, to the development of globalization; in the area of ideas, to the broader development of ideologies and values; and in the area of institutions, to the broader process of development in multilateral and regional arrangements. Third, the system is also open to (and in some ways embedded in) the domestic political, economic and institutional arrangements of the EC/EU and the US, and subject to the changing climate of political debate and contending ideas that characterises those two arenas.

Despite its robustness and longevity, this is a system apparently beset by persistent crises. That being so, it is important to understand what dimensions of crisis might help us to investigate and evaluate the phenomenon. At one level, the nature of crisis in the system can be read off the four central elements outlined above: power, markets, ideas and institutions. Thus:

	Crisis in terms of power arises from the changing balance of power between the members of the ‘Euro-American system’ in the context of the broader global balance, and from the challenges this poses to the mechanisms of management.

	Crisis in terms of markets arises from the intensification and unevenness of market relations between the members of the system, in the context of globalization, in which disruption and the uneasy balance of sensitivity and vulnerability are key issues.

	Crisis in terms of ideas arises from shifts and rifts in the level of consensus among members of the system, and from the mismatch of ideological and value orientations among the members, linked to the broader development of ideology and values in the global arena.

	Crisis in terms of institutions arises when existing institutions become saturated or overloaded, when there is a lack of investment in institution-building or maintenance, when investment is directed into domestic or exclusive institutional arrangements or into global institutions at the expense of Euro-American arrangements.

So far so (apparently) obvious: the ‘Euro-American system’ is one of complexity, openness and change, in which there is an uneasy mix of features arising from power, markets, ideas and institutions, and in which there is the potential for periodic crises. The broad question of development and change in the system merits further detailed investigation, but the intention in this paper is to focus strongly on the issues arising from the different types of crisis outlined above: crises of power, markets, ideas and institutions. In order to do this, we need to retrieve some ideas from the literature of international crisis and crisis management.

Here, it is argued that three avenues of enquiry are important: first, arguments about the significance of context; second, arguments about causality; third, arguments about the scope, intensity and contagion of crises. The argument is presented here in general form, and later it will be related to the empirical record of EU-US crises. Three caveats (at least!) are in order. First, much of the literature dealing with crises and crisis management is a product of the Cold War, and specifically of the relations between the United States and the USSR, and it therefore needs to be treated with caution when applied to the context of post-Cold War EU-US relations. Second, much of the literature as a result is strongly focused on bilateral crises and crisis management, with a strongly rationalist tone, and it has to be ‘stretched’ in some respects to accommodate the kind of complex, multilevel relationships that are at the core of EC/EU-US relations. Third, studies of crisis have focused strongly on situations in which war or the use of force is a potential outcome, whereas in EU-US relations that is hardly a foreseeable contingency. Nonetheless, it is argued here that it asks questions that can be applied with due care and attention to the matters at hand. 






In describing and analysing international crisis, it is important to keep in mind a number of contextual features. Among these are:

	The overall climate of world politics, including the pervasiveness and rate of change, the level of uncertainty and the stability of key institutions.

	The extent to which a given crisis is linked to broader forces of world politics, and the role of externalities or linkages between the crisis and the broader world arena.

	The focus of the crisis: is it ‘intramural’ (within a defined set of relationships), ‘extramural’ (challenging the set of relationships from outside) or ‘intermural’ (simultaneously possessing the internal and external dimensions)?

	System structure: in multipolar systems, the implications of crisis are likely to be different in important respects from crises in bipolar systems.

	The level of anticipation of a particular crisis by the participants: how much is a given crisis a surprise?

	The extent to which the crisis is seen as threatening key values and stakes for the participants, or the dissolution of the system as a whole.

	The extent to which the crisis engages the domestic political and economic systems of the participants.






Studies of crisis identify a number of forces as being implicated in the occurrence of such events. Among these are:

	Power structures and power shifts. This might also be described as the ‘tectonic’ theory of crisis, in the sense that it focuses on the ways in which major changes in the distribution of power create disequilibrium and frictions, leading to crises between status quo and revisionist powers, or between rising and falling powers in the international hierarchy. Such changes can also include the creation of power vacuums where a major power disappears and where the successor powers compete for influence and position in the new context.

	Integration and disintegration. Such forces imply that crises emerge from the tightening or loosening of connectedness between major participants and the challenges to perceived interests or to established structures that are thereby created. These forces can arise out of the desire to retain or assert autonomy within a situation of deepening integration, or the desire to ensure a favourable distribution of the benefits or costs arising from integration. Where disintegration takes place, the desire to ensure that the costs and benefits are favourably distributed and to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the fluidity of the international situation is a potent source of crises.

	Ideational convergence or divergence. Crisis among a group of actors can emerge from the assertion of divergent identities and the sharpening of differences between them. In this case, the ways in which political elites and leaderships define group identities, and the extent to which this entails the ‘othering’ of those with whom they are closely involved, are key features of the generation of crisis. Such crises are not just in the mind, but they are focused and magnified by the extent to which previously shared experiences are challenged or differences magnified.

	Institutional asymmetries. Crises can be shaped if not precipitated by the occurrence of institutional asymmetries among major actors, through which events are refracted and ‘processed’ in divergent ways. Where institutions are in flux and unstable, where their legitimacy is challenged and where they develop institutional pathologies, there is likely to be a tendency towards the exacerbation of differences among actors and towards the occurrence of more severe crises.

Taken together, these forces provide a means of profiling the factors and forces leading to crises, and to the magnification of apparently unimportant issues into crises. They also, of course, map onto the dimensions of the ‘Euro-American system’ outlined in the previous section, and the implications of this will be drawn out more fully below.


(iii) Scope, Intensity and Contagion

Whilst the forces outlined above can provide indications of when crises might occur, why they might occur and why they might be magnified, it is necessary to go further and to explore the ways in which crises are experienced and have effects, particularly on decision-making among the participants. A number of important distinctions can be made:

	Between long term and short term crises. Clearly there is a major difference between a crisis that blows up and is then resolved or forgotten, and one that persists. Very often, short-term crises might occur as part of or alongside long-term crises. The degree of compression or urgency associated with a crisis also has important implications for crisis decision-making on the part of political leaderships, as has been demonstrated in a number of classic studies.

	Between chronic and acute crises. This distinction is allied to that between long-term and short-term crises. It relates also to the degree of awareness and anticipation existing among participants in relation to the crisis, and to the degree of tension generated by the crisis. The most famous classic treatment of this distinction, that of Charles Herrmann (1969), deploys three key criteria in distinguishing between types of crisis: degree of threat, level of urgency and level of surprise. Although chronic crises might thus be seen as less threatening and urgent, and more anticipated, this is not a simple distinction: as E.H. Carr argued in his classic Twenty Years’ Crisis, the underlying chronic crisis of institutions, values and political will between World Wars I and II was obscured on many occasions by the onset of acute crises demanding immediate action.

	Between crises of a system, crises in a system and crises for the participants. These are key distinctions, bearing directly as we shall see on the possibility and nature of crisis management. Crisis of a system implies that the foundations – institutional, ideational, material – of a system of relations are at stake, and that dissolution or radical change of the system is at least a possibility. Crisis in a system implies that the problems are confined to the participants and their mutual relations, and that (again by implication) the crisis can be contained within the system without threatening its existence. Crisis for the participants arises from the impact of events within or outside the system on individual members or groups of members; central to this aspect of crisis is that the impact of these factors can be and very often is asymmetrical, and that some members of the system will suffer more or gain more from a particular challenge than others. The tension between crisis for the whole and crisis for the parts of a system is clearly fundamental both to perceptions of crisis and to prescriptions for crisis management (see below).

	Between the different potential resonances of crisis. The key question here is, how do the consequences of crisis feed into the development of a system of relations? At one level, this resolves itself into a discussion about whether crises are cyclical or structural, and whether they are recognised as such by the participants. At another, it is a question about whether crises are endogenous to the system – a part of its normal functioning – or whether they are exogenous, the manifestation of forces that challenge the system itself. To put it simply, crisis and its management (or mis-management) might be seen as  contained, catalytic, cathartic or catastrophic. In the first case, crisis is seen as a contingent liability of the system, but not as a challenge to the fundamentals. In the second case, crisis crystallizes and underlines differences, and sharpens perceptions of the stakes for the participants. In the third case, crisis has a cleansing function: differences are put on the table, dealt with and the relationship is strengthened. In the fourth case, crisis leads to a genuine breakdown of relations and possibly to the dissolution of the system. In each of the cases, the resonance is not confined to those immediately involved, and can have effects on the functioning of the broader world arena; in the words of Stanley Hoffmann, ‘crises are like rocks thrown into a pond: the stones disappear but the reverberations ruffle the waters all around’ (1968: 62).


Collectively, these features give the basis for an appreciation of the scope and potential contagion of crisis affecting a system of relations. Importantly, they indicate that even relatively simple and clearcut challenges to a system of relations are likely to evoke differences among the participants in terms of their material interests, perceptions and narratives of crisis, and that by extension they are likely to give rise to different and potentially conflicting modes of crisis management. The lessons for EC/EU-US relations are at this level of generality only too obvious.

(iv) From Crisis to Crisis Management

Much of the literature of international crisis is closely linked to ideas about crisis management. Since the literature in many cases emerged from the Cold War period and was directed towards an understanding of crises actually or potentially occurring between two nuclear-armed Superpowers, the link is not difficult to understand. The doctrines of crisis management were first fostered explicitly in the Korean War and thereafter developed with increasing sophistication (Williams 197?, Snyder and Diesing 1977, Lebow 1981, Craig and George 1995). A number of key themes in the literature can be identified here (and of course they link with the interpretations of crisis outlined above):

	Rationales for crisis management. The question ‘why manage?’ is implicit in much of the crisis management literature. An associated question relates to the interests served by management: is it part of a collective interest shared by participants in the system (or indeed by the world at large), or is it a reflection of partial or sectional interests? It can easily be seen that there are incentives (for example) for the powerful to manage crisis in their own interests, which may or may not coincide with the collective interests of those involved in the system. Equally, there are incentives for others at least potentially to abstain from management in the belief that an intensification of tensions and differences is in their interests. This sort of tension is inseparable from the idea of crisis management itself, whether it is conducted between states, within families or elsewhere.

	Modes of crisis management. There is a wide range of possible approaches to crisis management, many of which raise important questions about the roles of power, institutions, rules and negotiation in world politics. Key approaches are those relying on the development of formal or informal rules, the use of negotiation and bargaining, and the deployment of material power. Some would argue that crisis by its very nature defies the creation of predictable and consistent rules, but others have pointed to the development of ‘conventions of crisis’ where relations among those involved are relatively stable, and to the emergence of crisis management technologies in order to provide reliable information and a basis for planning. There is clearly in this area an important distinction between bilateral generation of rules, conventions and technologies and the multilateral development of institutions. The distinction is underlined by the coexistence of what might be termed ‘coercive’ and ‘persuasive’ modes of crisis negotiation and bargaining, which clearly raise the issues attached to the uses of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power in crisis situations.

	Outcomes of crisis management. Much of the crisis management literature identifies an enduring tension between crisis management as a search for relative gains and crisis management as the quest for absolute gains. The first of these, essentially realist in genesis, envisages crisis management as a win-lose process in which the deployment of power or the manipulation of institutions enables some participants to make relative gains. The second envisages crisis management as a process of communication, persuasion and mutual learning in which all parties can gain, and in which the collective interest of the participants lies in effective management. Empirically, all processes of crisis management are likely to embody elements of both these factors, with important implications for the handling of bargaining and negotiation and for the ways in which parties emerge from the management process.

	Logics of crisis management. The features outlined above underline the ways in which crisis management can embody logics of ‘consequences’ and ‘appropriateness’. On the one hand, the enterprise can be seen as one in which material outcomes expressed in terms of political and economic advantage are key; on the other, it can be viewed as a process in which there is a premium on social learning and social responsiveness and on the framing and re-framing of policy spaces through a process of communication – what Risse has termed the logic of arguing (Risse 0000). Especially in complex relationships, it is unlikely that either of these logics will exist in its pure form: the interesting questions about crisis management are precisely those that start from the coexistence and intersection of these logics.

What are the implications of these features for the study of EC/EU-US relations in general? It is clearly important to establish the relevance of the ideas discussed here to the specific case of the ‘Euro-American system’, which as already noted is characterised by diversity of participants, complexity of structure, multilevel processes and high levels of linkages and externalities.

The figure below attempts to summarise the ways in which concepts of crisis and crisis management might be applied to the EC/EU-US relationship. By its nature, it raises questions rather than providing answers, but it also serves as a foundation for more empirical exploration in the next two parts of the paper.

Figure 1: Crisis and Crisis Management in EC/EU-US Relations: Generating Questions

Context	Climate: the Cold War (variations in it) and after; differential rates of change, effects on legitimacy and stability of regimes/institutions?Linkages: openness of transatlantic relationship: externalities for the world arena in politics, economics, security?.Focus: affected by high level of openness/linkages and multilevel nature of relationship as it develops; potential for multiple crises in different sectors, ‘intramural’, ‘extramural’ and ‘intermural’?.Anticipation: affected by openness, linkages and multilevel nature; problems of balance and attention?Values/Stakes: basic consensus but affected by changing climate; variation in participants, changes in perception of key values?
Causality	Power Structures and Power Shifts: initial US dominance/hegemony; crises of resistance and of power redistribution as EC/EU develop? Linkages with broader world balance and impact of change (e.g. unipolarity in post-Cold War period)?Integration and Disintegration: major growth in connectedness and interdependence/interpenetration; crises of autonomy, institutionalisation (institutions as stakes), issues of costs and risks? Effects of broader turbulence and globalization?Ideational Convergence/Divergence: EC/EU assertiveness combines with US perceptions of leadership and followership; crises of elite consensus involving ‘othering’ and sharpening of difference?Institutional Asymmetries: impact of institutional change and challenge; crises through externalisation of ‘domestic’ institutional shifts in EC/EU and US? Crises reflecting adequacy of transatlantic institutional structure? How far projected into global/multilateral institutions?
Scope/Intensity/Contagion	Long/Short-term Crises: different rhythms of change in politics, economics, security: crises of adjustment occurring concurrently? Capacity of EC/EU and US to undertake effective crisis decision-making in different domains?Chronic/Acute Crises: challenges to capacity to discriminate and maintain strategic coherence; EC/EU-US crises as extreme test given wide range and incidence of disputes short of crisis, of crises short of breakdown?Crises in/of/system, for Participants: problems of discrimination and attention given diversity and multilevel nature of system; strong likelihood of asymmetrical impact and stakes, uneven distribution of risks and potential costs, tension of whole and parts?Resonance of Crisis: where crises are built into the system, how can participants evaluate whether they are contained, catalytic, cathartic or catastrophic? How can they tell what is at stake? How can they develop reliable narratives of causes and implications?




Crises and Crisis Management in EU-US Relations to the 1990s

Having established at least the major components of a framework for the analysis of EU-US crises and their management, this part of the paper focuses on the ways in which this framework might be deployed to support an investigation of EU-US crises before the end of the Cold War. ‘EU-US crises’ here are defined as those episodes that have generated a major discourse of crisis and have been perceived as crises in policy communities on both sides of the relationship. The focus is thus not on specific individual tensions or disputes but on the periods of crisis that have been seen as characterising the 1960s, the 1970s, the 1980s and the 1990s, and the US presidencies of Kennedy/Johnson, Nixon, Reagan and Clinton. As noted above and by others (for example Jones 2004, Peterson 2004a, Lundestad 1997) there is a huge literature on these episodes, but relatively little of it has attempted a systematic analysis of what made these episodes into crises, how they were articulated, how they were conducted or how they were managed (if they were managed). Here, they are presented in outline form, simply as a way of probing the relevance of the framework and then providing the base on which to move into an evaluation of the ‘four years’ crisis’ in the early 2000s. The discussion draws upon a range of standard sources dealing with the broad development of EU-US relations and the ‘Euro-American system’ (Chace and Ravenal 1976, Freedman 1983, Smith 1984, Calleo 1987, Lundestad 1997, Peterson 1996, Featherstone and Ginsberg 1996, Smith and Woolcock 1993, Gompert and Larrabee 1996).

(i) The 1960s: Crisis in Community or Crisis under Hegemony?

In terms of the argument so far, the context for the occurrence of transatlantic crisis in the 1960s possessed a number of dominating features. The key elements were continuing US hegemony in both political/economic and political/security issues, a strongly growing but still relatively modest and asymmetrical integration of markets, a discourse and practice of security but also of economic interdependence dominated by the USA and the established institutions of NATO and the Bretton Woods system, and a fledgling European Community centred on a limited number of core states with internal problems about the intensification of market and political integration, enlargement and low levels of security integration. Not surprisingly, it might be concluded, the crisis that emerged within the ‘Atlantic community’ was centred on relations between the USA and particular European states, in which the EC was viewed more as a stake than as a participant. The predominant events around which the crisis surged, and through which it might be argued it was managed, were those of European security and (later) of US imperial engagement in Vietnam and elsewhere. But to argue thus is to neglect the tensions surrounding the management of the international political economy, in which it was noticeable for the first time that the EC gave the Member States a collective capacity to resist and defend themselves against US dominance. By the end of the 1960s, it was clear that the combination of security tensions with economic contradictions and divergence was at least beginning to put a new spin on the transatlantic relationship. The near-certainty of EC enlargement to encompass the UK meant that this was likely to become more rather than less challenging; although the crises of the 1960s might have been resolved within the presumption of US predominance, this was not guaranteed to persist.

(ii) The 1970s: America as an Ordinary Country, the EC as a Civilian Power?

It was in the 1970s that some decisive shifts in the context of EC/US crisis occurred. The development of US-Soviet détente opened up new challenges and opportunities for all engaged in the ‘Euro-American system’ and created new uncertainties about status and precedence. Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy not only recognised but also advocated a ‘pentapolar world’ in which (prematurely) the Europeans collectively were allocated a management responsibility. At the same time, however, the instabilities of the international financial system (themselves linked intimately to US foreign policy and the fate of intervention in Southeast Asia and the Middle East) created strains for the Bretton Woods institutions. The crisis of the 1970s was thus a more far-reaching and profound one than that of the 1960s, since it engaged the Europeans and the Americans across the spectrum of their mutual relations and domestic policies  and subjected them to far greater entanglement with the broader world arena. To put it simply, this was a multiple crisis in which the tectonic shifts of power were accompanied by the recognition of vulnerability, the clash of ideas about world order and the perceived inadequacies of existing institutions. Not surprisingly, the practices of crisis management in the Euro-American system were stretched to the limit, and became implicated with problems of domestic institutional development in the EC and the US. In the US, the post-Nixon uncertainties and institutional challenges were a severe constraint on the exercise of hegemonic management, whilst in the EC the impact of enlargement and of economic and institutional weaknesses led to a wide-ranging debate about the implications of this Atlantic crisis at the same time as it revealed in dim outline the potential of the EC in the exercise of ‘civilian power’. It could be argued that this was a classic multiple crisis in which the chronic and the acute coexisted, in which hard lessons were learned about the limits of crisis management techniques and in which the beginnings of institutional efforts at crisis management might be discerned among the rubble. In particular, the institutionalisation of management devices in the political-economic part of the spectrum was a noticeable part of the limited progress that was made

(iii) The 1980s: Contending Narratives of the New Europe






(iv) Crises and Crisis Management in the 1990s





What general strands can be extracted from the brief outlines of four decades presented above? It is possible to identify a number of important broad trends and tendencies, as part of the background to analysis of the ‘four years’ crisis’ in the next section of the paper:

	Context. There is evidence that the context for EC/EU-US crises has shifted in important ways. The power balance has changed, but not evenly; the fluctuation between tension and détente within the Cold War had significant effects on the possibilities for the definition of crisis and the mechanisms of management (see below); the linkages between the EC/EU-US relationship and the broader global arena have intensified; the focus of crisis has shifted and the potential for multiple crisis has been underlined. This means that by the end of the 1980s  there was a premium on the capacity to anticipate issues that could precipitate EC/US crises, but that only in certain areas had the institutional and other capacities to support this been developed.

	Causality. There is strong support for the broad argument that EC/EU-US crises are multi-causal. There is a fluctuating mix of power factors, market factors, social/ideational factors and institutional factors (both international and domestic) in the precipitation and shaping of crisis, but there is also support for the argument that in any specific episode some of these will matter more than others. Importantly, when there is evidence of problems in all four of these areas, there will be a far greater likelihood not only of crisis, but also of lack of inclination or capacity to manage it. The mechanisms by which the four factors come together or diverge are unclear, but will bear further investigation.

	Scope/Intensity/Contagion. The treatment of the situation up to the 1990s indicates that in general, the scope of EC/EU-US crises had broadened, and that the intensity with which crisis was experienced by political leaderships and broader groups on both sides had increased. As time has gone on, the tendency for transatlantic crises to be linked to both domestic and broader international turbulence has persisted, reflecting the openness of the Euro-American system both to popular and to external forces. Policy elites have come under greater pressure to manage but at the same time greater pressure has been exerted on their capacities to manage crisis, and it has been increasingly difficult to contain crisis or to pay attention to the many dimensions of crisis (political/economic/security, linkages, different levels and implications). It is not clear whether any kind of ‘menu’ for crisis management has developed, or whether successive policy communities have had to re-learn the lessons or techniques. We need to question whether a dominant and shared narrative in terms of describing and evaluating EC/EU-US crises had emerged by the late 1990s, or whether there were competing and diverging discourses.

	Management. This has already been touched on above, but it is important to note a number of key issues. It seems clear that there is a tension at all stages between the collective transatlantic interest and the particular interests of specific countries. This is especially true in the case of the US and of France (the latter especially but certainly not only in the 1960s), but can be discerned also in the cases of Britain and Germany, for example. Whilst there seems to have been significant and cumulative investment in crisis management capacities in the economic field, this has not been so obviously true in the political/security field (although the picture in complicated by the coexistence of the EC/EU and NATO, the latter the more obvious channel for management in the political/security field until the 1990s). There clearly has been a shifting balance between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power as the basis for management over an extended period, and along with this an enhancement of the role of the EC/EU in the management of transatlantic crisis – although the implications of the fact that the EU by the late 1990s had become the ‘European’ end of the relationship almost alone are yet to be realised. On the basis fo the brief examination here, it is not possible to reach and clear conclusions on the ways in which gains and losses are allocated in the relationship as a result of crisis management, but it seems logical to suggest that the increasingly bipolar nature of the relationship means that gains and losses will be defined more in zero-sum terms and in terms of relative gains/losses across a growing part of the policy spectrum. Again, though, this is clearer in the political/security area than in the political./economic area, where there is a different level of multilateral institutionalisation and of broader global issue-formation. This may mean that by the end of the 1990s, there was an established predisposition to the logic of appropriateness and arguing in transatlantic political/economic relations, supported by appropriate institutions and bargains, but no such secure basis in political/security relations, where there continued to be a focus on relative gains and divergent discourses of crisis management.

On the basis of these tentative and partial conclusions, the paper now goes on to explore the experience of the ‘four years’ crisis’ between the EU and the US under the first George W Bush Administration. What kind of crisis has this been, how if at all has it been managed, and what might be the repercussions of the crisis for the future course of EU-US relations?


Reading the ‘Four Years’ Crisis’

As noted at the beginning of the paper, there is a vast range of analysis and of evaluation when it comes to the four years of EU-US tension experienced between 2000 and 2004. In this section, the aim is to summarise some key aspects of the period, to identify the ways in which the crisis developed and to evaluate the ways in which it can be said to have been managed. In undertaking this analysis, the aim is to keep in mind the questions raised and provisional conclusions reached in the earlier parts of the paper.

It is important to note that at one level the ‘four years’ crisis’ relied upon trends and tendencies established during the 1990s. Although the Clinton administrations had adopted a more multilateral and accommodating stance than the George W Bush administration on many issues, there had been evidence towards the end of the 1990s that the limits of accommodation were being reached – over the treatment of conflict, the negotiation of a range of global issues and the handling of some aspects of global governance. More specifically, it might be said that by the end of the 1990s, the development of global turbulence, coupled with the internal development of both the USA and the EU, had created the preconditions for an escalation of tensions. Global turbulence meant that there would likely be more areas in which the EU and the US would confront uncertainty and challenge; internal developments, including the rise of the neo-conservative right in the USA and the consolidation of European institutions in the foreign and security policy areas, meant that there was more likely to be a clash of values and policies across the Atlantic. The whole picture, of course, was thrown into sharp relief by the events of September 11th 2001, which posed huge challenges and created new opportunities and risks for both the EU and the US (Hill 2004, Peterson and Pollack 2003).

One way of describing the crisis that had emerged even before 9/11, and one that has had great prominence, is to say that it was essentially a crisis of unilateralism. Assertive US policies, fed by the effective unipolarity that had developed after the end of the Cold War, meant that in many ways crisis was created deliberately, as a kind of test the EU could not pass. Crisis, that is to say, was manipulated as a means of exercising power and underlining the predominance of the US in parts of the power spectrum that the EU simply could not collectively occupy. In part, this manipulation related to matters outside but closely linked to the EU-US relationship, especially the politics of the Middle East; in part, it was aimed at the broader system of multilateral institutions that gave the EU sustenance in important parts of its external policies; in part, it was aimed at the internal workings of the EU itself, continuing a policy of divide and rule that as we have seen was important to EC/US crises in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. This is not, of course, to argue that the crises created and nurtured by the US administration were aimed primarily at the disruption of the EU’s external status and pretensions, but they certainly had that effect, not least through the ways in which the US could penetrate and encouraged defection from the CFSP and ESDP. It is also possible to take a much more positive view of this aspect of the crisis: to argue, in effect, that the US stance was catalytic for the development of the ESDP and for the development of a far more consciously different EU security policy to which all Member States in effect were able to sign up (Menon 2004)

At another level, as indicated earlier, the crisis of 2000-2004 was less a crisis of unilateralism than a crisis about adjustment to the new balance in EU-US relations. In other words, the crisis emerged out of the continuing structural tensions set up by the end of the Cold War, and demanded of each of the parties a process of learning and institutional or policy adjustment to reflect the new realities. So the lack of major crises in the 1990s had in effect been a lull before the storm – a storm that might well have occurred both without 9/11 and without the Bush administration. With both, the crisis was more acute and more focused, and posed in the starkest possible terms the need to come to an eventual adjustment and accommodation. The crisis was thus, among other things, a return to ‘normal politics’ in the transatlantic relationship, or the establishment of a new normality taking account of the fact that the EU had developed institutionally to the point at which it could conduct almost a full-spectrum relationship with the USA. The ‘almost’ is important, of course, because whether or not the crisis was one of adjustment to a new reality, it did demonstrate the continuing lack of EU credibility and capability in the hard security area. This had been demonstrated throughout the 1990s as well, but the lesson of the 1990s was also that (haltingly) the EU had produced solutions to the crisis of credibility and legitimacy it had undergone.

A third way of describing the ‘four years’ crisis’ is as one of mutual vulnerability. It has often been remarked that alongside the US’ assertion of unprecedented power and primacy has gone a perception of unprecedented vulnerability. On this reading, the Bush administration’s response to 9/11 in the form of the ‘war on terror’ and the war in Iraq is at least partly beside the point, since the point is one about the ways in which US society can be attacked in new and unorthodox ways. The exercise of massive military force is thus not an answer to the question posed, but it is a way of attempting to incorporate the crisis into a language in which the US is proficient. For the Europeans the crisis has been one, as noted above, in which they have been attacked at their weakest collective point by their most significant other, and have not unnaturally attempted collectively to move back onto ground where they have a comparative advantage. For both, therefore, the management of the crisis between them can be seen as a matter of self-preservation, but in attempting to shift the crisis back onto the ground where they are strongest each of them has succeeded in exacerbating the suspicions and fears of the other. It is not as simple as that, of course: the fact that this crisis spanned several policy domains, underlining the linkages between them and leading to forms of political hostage-taking in each of them, meant that the incentives to return to a shared narrative of events and their implications were not always apparent. 

Finally, it is possible to read the ‘four years’ crisis’ as one of ideas and values, in which the Europeans and the Americans alike (but in very different directions) felt the need not only to safeguard core values for the sake of the values themselves but also to promote difference as a means of self-identification. Such analysis is often undertaken in the case of the Europeans, where the end of the Cold War and the shifting foundations of the EU has made the notion of a European identity and the promotion of ‘European’ values almost two sides of the same coin, but it must also be recognised that it has value in the US case. The generation of new images of Americanness, begun under Ronald Reagan and moderated both by George H W Bush and Bill Clinton, resumed with a vengeance under George W Bush and fed with great force into the already turbulent EU-US relationship. Atlantic crises throughout the last 50 years have been at one level crises of self-realisation and self-definition, and it is thus to be expected that they will contain significant processes of ‘othering’ on the part of all concerned. In the absence of an agreed ‘other’ external to the relationship, and in the presence of important incentives to capitalise on material or institutional assets in the context of the relationship, there is every reason to anticipatea kind of transatlantic ‘crisis slide’ exacerbated by competing images and readings of the global situation.

What do these partial but often complementary readings of the ‘four years’ crisis’ allow us to conclude about its relationship to the broader evolution of EU-US relations since the 1960s? In particular, how do they help us to address the ‘what’s new or different?’ question and to address the apparent paradox of fundamental challenge but essential convergence posed at the beginning of the paper? The following conclusions are couched in the terms used earlier for analysis of crisis in general and for evaluation of the pre-2000 evolution of EU-US relations.

	First, context. The period 2000-2004 sees the coming together of a number of forces that arguably formed a critical mass of contextual influences and permitted an acute but also lasting crisis for EU-US relations. Among these influences are: the coming to fruition of a number of post-Cold War conflict lines, especially the foregrounding of asymmetric warfare and terrorism; the continuing openness, sensitivity and vulnerability of EU-US relations to global turbulence, in the political, economic and security domains; the linking of crises and conflicts in a number of issue-areas seen as central by either the EU, or the US, or both; challenges to the basic consensus among policy elites on the two sides of the Atlantic relating to core values and images of transatlantic relations; lack of anticipation and thus of contingency planning for the types of crisis that emerged. But as before it must be emphasised that the unevenness of the impact and perception of these forces is a key feature and one that is essential to an understanding of the crisis.

	Second, causality. Central to the causes of the ‘four years’ crisis’ was the shifting balance of power between the EU and the US. As we have seen, this was apparent during the 1990s, but it was also accompanied by a strong perception of the ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ which moderated its impact on policy actions on both sides of the Atlantic. The continued erosion of NATO – especially significant in the wake of 9/11 – meant that the focus of transatlantic tensions about the balance of power, and consequent issues of leadership and followership, was increasingly on EU-US relations and (formo a Bush administration perspective) on the inadequacies of the EU. This is turn led to the privileging of certain bilateral relationships such as the US-UK relationship, and thus to a crisis within the EU itself as escalation towards the war in Iraq took place. Outside this central, security-related crisis, there was a focus on issues that reflected the value divergence between Europeans and Americans about the uses of multilateralism (Kyoto, the ICC) and the need for international institution-building. There was remarkably little feed through from the central security crisis to the political/economic sphere, and disputes that arose in this context were (however sharply expressed) dealt with via the existing institutional arrangements, supported not only by governmental action but also in many cases by strong private pressures for agreement. As noted above, there was significant evidence of divergent ideas and values, and of the ways in which these fed into ‘othering’ and the emphasising of difference. It could be argued that this was the period in which for many Europeans the US ceased to be both ‘self’ and ‘other’ and became more unambiguously ‘other’, with consequent implications for EU self-definition. Finally, it is clear that although there were significant transatlantic institutional ties in security matters as well as economic matters before 2000, the events of the period 2000-2004 stretched these security ties to the limit and beyond. Of the multiple causal factors operating in the crisis, some would argue that the structural power factor was and is the most fundamental. If that is a necessary condition, though, it is not sufficient to explain the specific focus and evolution of the crisis itself.

	Third, scope/intensity/contagion. It is evident that the events of 2000-2004 engaged participants and structures of the EU-US relationship and thus of the ‘Euro-American system’ on a very wide front and over a range of linked issue areas. There was evidence of tensions if not outright challenges to the basis of the system in a number of these areas, most obviously hard security. It has to be said, as others have emphasised, that there was also a good deal of collaborative work and effective cooperation in areas where the EU had established credentials and credibility. This was a multiple but uneven crisis for EU-US relations, which made itself felt with widely varying degrees of urgency and intensity, and which thus challenged the capacity of both the EU and the US to maintain consistent and coherent decision-making procedures. One of the problems both for participants and for analysts has been how to decide whether this was/is a chronic structural crisis requiring basic re-thinking and threatening breakdown, or a series of acute crises that could be managed back into their appropriate place within the Euro-American system. President Bush’s visit to Brussels in February 2005 seemed essentially to be based on the latter assumption, but it is by no means clear given the scope and intensity of the challenges experienced over the past four years that this is the case. On thing that is clear is that the crisis was felt and impacted upon participants unevenly, and that there were several different narratives of the crisis, with attendant prescriptions for its resolution, being peddled at any one time. This is not unprecedented in EC/EU-US crises as we have seen, but it was at an unprecedented level and intensity in this case. The asymmetry of perceptions, of stakes and of prescriptions arises from the very wide scope of the crisis and from the challenge it posed to institutions that were themselves in a state of flux, especially on the European side; but it also reflects the tectonics of the underlying power structure and especially the incursion of the EU into new areas in which its credibility and coherence was bound to be at issue.






When a paper is this long, it is wise not to have a long conclusion! Briefly, the paper has tried to do the following:

	Clarify the puzzle surrounding the occurrence and management of crisis within the ‘Euro-American system’.

	Propose a series of questions that can be used to form a framework for the analysis of crises and crisis management within the ‘Euro-American system’.

	Review some outline evidence from the evolution of the system in general and from the past four years in particular, with the aim of seeing what it adds to our understanding of crises and crisis management within the system.

	Suggest ways in which the ‘four years’ crisis’ is both similar to and different from the previous crisis periods in EU-US relations, and to identify the implications for analysis of the ‘Euro-American system’.

As hinted earlier in the paper, three key conclusions can be identified on this basis:

	First, the ‘four years’ crisis’ is distinctive among crises within the ‘Euro-American system. It took place within a context that varied in vital respects from those of previous crisis periods; it displayed a potent mix of causal factors, many of which fed with unprecedented intensity into the course of the crisis and gave it a distinctive scope and intensity; and it demonstrated that the effective management of such crisis periods depends upon the generation or recovery of shared narratives and discourses as much as upon the repair of institutions and relationships. In particular, it reflected the fact that the ‘Euro-American system’ is now almost consubstantial with the ‘EU-US system’ and that this has changed the stakes and the possible shifting alignments within the system as a whole – a condition that will continue to have important effects.

	Second, the crisis was essentially uneven in origins, process and impact. In particular, it was uneven as regards its prime focus on hard security, which was not paralleled or replicated in areas of softer security, of political/economic relations and of non-governmental networks. An explanation for this unevenness can be sought in the social and institutional characteristics of these issue areas, and in particular in the fact that there is at least forty years of social and institutional development behind the management of crisis in those areas, compared with the still primitive forms of joint or multilateral management characterising EU-US security relationships. This suggests that the development of a more active process of joint management for EU-US security relations is desirable, but it also suggests that it will be very difficult.
	Third, whilst the ‘four years’ crisis’ is distinctive, it is not detached from history. The previous experience of crises and their management in the ‘Euro-American system’ provides both a standard for comparison and a measure of how far things have changed in the post-Cold War era. It also provides important questions about the credentials of institutional bargains, and about the importance of memory and learning, that are critical to the understanding of what goes on between the EU and the US in the broader sense.
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